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Abstract
Neural networks are vulnerable to a wide range
of erroneous inputs such as adversarial, corrupted,
out-of-distribution, and misclassified examples.
In this work, we train a linear SVM classifier to
detect these four types of erroneous data using
hidden and softmax feature vectors of pre-trained
neural networks. Our results indicate that these
faulty data types generally exhibit linearly sepa-
rable activation properties from correct examples,
giving us the ability to reject bad inputs with no
extra training or overhead. We experimentally
validate our findings across a diverse range of
datasets, domains, pre-trained models, and adver-
sarial attacks.
1. Introduction
Humans are capable of adapting to diverse types of data in
ways machine learning models cannot (Geirhos et al., 2018).
While the human visual system is able to generalize across
varying image representations such as different Instagram
filters, deep learning classifiers misbehave when presented
with image corruptions (Dodge & Karam, 2017; Hendrycks
& Dietterich, 2019), adversarial examples (Szegedy et al.,
2014), and previously unseen classes (Bendale & Boult,
2015; Hendrycks et al., 2019; Scheirer et al., 2013). In
this work, we automatically detect a broad range of inputs
that will be incorrectly classified by a neural network. The
timely, preemptive detection of these failures is essential
for preventing unreliable AI action based on incorrect pre-
dictions. With the deployment of deep learning models in
real-world applications such as autonomous vehicles and
medical devices, an automated technique that broadly iden-
tifies when a model is in error is critically important for safe
AI (Amodei et al., 2016).
Erroneous inputs come in many forms, and subsequently
much of the research has been siloed into sub-domains. Out-
of-distribution detection identifies when inputs are outside
of a model’s training (i.e., unseen classes) (DeVries & Tay-
lor, 2018; Hendrycks et al., 2019; Lee et al., 2018; Liang
et al., 2018; Scheirer et al., 2013). Adversarial inputs are
subtly perturbed examples meant to fool a model (Lu et al.,
2017; Metzen et al., 2017; Pang et al., 2018). Corrupted
Figure 1. Current neural network models are vulnerable to erro-
neous inputs (adversarial, corrupted, out-of-distribution, and other
misclassifications). We find we can preemptively detect this broad
set of inputs from the network’s own internal activations in re-
sponse to the stimuli. For example, in this figure, an image cor-
rupted by Gaussian noise (which the network will incorrectly
classify as a frog) is identified and halted, while the non-corrupted
version is allowed to proceed normally. We find we accurately
classify erroneous inputs across a range of models and datatypes.
inputs are similar to adversarial examples but are typically
not malicious (Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2019). Finally, mis-
classifications are an inevitable part of any model, as no
model has an absolutely perfect performance.
Given the breadth of erroneous input variations, it is un-
surprising that each of these inputs has been traditionally
tackled as a separate, individual problem requiring a unique,
specialized solution. However, in our study of these seem-
ingly disparate phenomena we noticed a common theme: the
network’s internal activation patterns were notably distinct
when stimuli were correctly processed. We hypothesized
that, by broadly considering inputs to be either ”correctly”
or ”incorrectly” processed, we could detect erroneous exam-
ples across a broad range of inputs.
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Figure 2. Two graphs showing the linear separability of erroneous datasets from correctly classified examples for the Tiny ImageNet model.
”0” on the y-axis represents the optimal hyperplane in a linear SVM classifier. Left: Corrupted (Tiny ImageNet-C) and out-of-distribution
images (SUN) are separated from correctly classified images using the sorted softmax features. Right: Two adversarial attack methods,
FGSM and Carlini and Wagner l2, are separated from correctly classified inputs using the activations of the final hidden layer. Ultimately,
we combined these features to achieve state-of-the-art results (Section 4.2). We include only the first 250 examples from each set to
improve readability. Similar graphs are in the appendix.
We test our detection technique with four pre-trained models,
each pre-trained on a separate dataset, and find our results
generalize to a multitude of alternative datasets. Further,
we find that our detection technique is robust to a range of
adversarial attacks.
To our knowledge, this work is the first to consider the feasi-
bility of broadly detecting all erroneous inputs. Specifically,
we find that the model’s internal activations in the softmax
layer and final hidden layer are sufficient for automatically
filtering incorrectly processed inputs. Figure 2 highlights the
separability of correct examples from erroneous examples.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• This is the first research showing that various erro-
neous inputs, which neural network models will fail to
correctly classify, can be identified using the model’s
activations in response to the input.
• We show that several common adversarial perturba-
tions tend to have softmax probabilities distinct from
correct examples.
• We achieve state-of-the-art results by considering the
activations of both the softmax and final hidden layer
of common pre-trained neural networks.
2. Related Work
A variety of research exists on automatically detecting in-
puts that will cause neural networks to fail. In this section
we discuss the four subfields that compose erroneous inputs
as well as the connections of the fields.
Adversarial Attacks Adversarial examples occur when
small, meaningful changes to clean data alter a network’s
prediction. Szegedy et al. (2014) highlighted these limita-
tions, giving rise to the field of adversarial attacks. Since
then, numerous methods have been proposed to generate
adversarial attacks (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b; Goodfellow
et al., 2015; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Papernot et al.,
2015).
Several works have attempted to defend against adver-
saries (Lu et al., 2017; Metzen et al., 2017), however, the
field largely conforms to a classic ”white hat”/”black hat”
paradigm (i.e., solutions are often temporary because new
attacks are created to overcome the defensive solution (Car-
lini & Wagner, 2017a)). To date, only a few defenses have
proven effective on smaller input dimensions (Madry et al.,
2019; Schott et al., 2018), making adversarial attacks a
significant problem in the field of machine learning.
Researchers have identified the upper bounds of adversar-
ial robustness techniques for certain distributions (Fawzi
et al., 2018; Gilmer et al., 2018; Mahloujifar et al., 2018).
In particular, Fawzi et al. (2018) suggested a strong relation
between adversarial robustness and the linearity of a classi-
fier in latent space. Gilmer et al. (2018) showed that when a
model misclassifies even a small fraction of inputs, it can
be exposed to adversarial perturbations of size Op1{?n),
where n is the number of dimensions in the input.
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Our work finds that adversarial inputs, generated using a
variety of methods (see Section 3.2.4, manifest distinct acti-
vation patterns that we use to detect when models will fail.
We also consider ”natural adversaries,” which categorically
overlap with misclassifications.
Image Corruption Deep learning models also perform
poorly on corrupted examples. Image corruption is an unin-
tentional, inevitable facet of real-world model deployment:
corrupted inputs can range from image quality degradation
to lighting changes. For example, autonomous driving mod-
els need to be robust to weather and debris (Chaabane et al.,
2020; Michaelis et al., 2019). In particular, networks have
shown to be susceptible to Gaussian noise, blur, pixelation,
and JPEG compression (Dodge & Karam, 2017; Hendrycks
& Dietterich, 2019). Some researchers have even proposed
that networks should be evaluated on their ability to gener-
alize across such inputs (RichardWebster et al., 2019).
Out-of-Distribution Detection (OoD) An OoD example
occurs when a model is presented with data outside of its
training paradigm. In this work, OoD examples originate
from datasets other than the dataset the baseline model was
trained on.
Hendrycks and Dietterich (2018) established a benchmark
for OoD detection by using the Maximum Softmax Prob-
ability (MSP). Results were presented on several datasets
in different neural network modals such as computer vi-
sion and natural language processing. Other works trained
neural networks to reject out-of-distribution data with
auxiliary branches (DeVries & Taylor, 2018), auxiliary
datasets (Hendrycks et al., 2019), GAN examples (Lee
et al., 2018), and other train-time techniques (Bevandic´
et al., 2018; Geifman & El-Yaniv, 2019).
Misclassified Examples and Thresholding Misclassified
examples occur when a model is trained on a class of data
but the model fails to predict the class successfully on a
new input. One technique to detect this poorly-learned data
is thresholding. Thesholding has a rich history of research
(Chow, 1970; 1957), however, we believe we are the first to
consider multiple layers of the network for thresholding.
Hendrycks and Dietterich (2018) provide thresholding re-
sults for misclassified examples on contemporary datasets,
while (Geifman & El-Yaniv, 2017) presented results of the
softmax response from a risk perspective. In recent years,
thresholding techniques have been applied to detect adver-
sarial examples (Lu et al., 2017; Pang et al., 2018) and OoD
examples (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2018). Lu et al. (2017)
provide the approach most similar to our own. They utilize
layers toward the end of deep learning models to detect
adversarial examples with SVM-RBF classifiers. Our work
shows an ability to detect some adversarial examples us-
ing these features; however, we surpass these standards by
considering the hidden layers as well as the softmax layer.
Connecting erroneous inputs Some recent research has
found similarities in the above areas. Hendrycks and
Gimpel (2018) showed that both misclassified and out-of-
distribution examples can be detected by utilizing the max-
imum softmax probability. Ford et al. (2019) proposed a
similarity between the fields of adversarial and corrupted
examples, showing empirical and theoretical evidence that
these two fields are manifestations of the same phenom-
ena. Another notable cross-domain technique was Liang
et al. (2018), who used adversarial perturbations on input
data to discriminate in-distribution from OoD examples.
Finally, Rozsa and Boult (2019) argued that adversarial per-
turbations exist in open space, contrary to popular belief
that they exist near training samples.
The above research highlights the distinct work being done
in each of these four fields, and previous work that has
identified connections between some of these fields. To our
knowledge, our work is the first to fully explore the link
between all of these areas, and the first to detect them with
a single approach.
3. Method
We first formally define the domain of erroneous inputs (Sec-
tion 3.1) and set up our experimental design (Section 3.2),
enumerating the pre-trained models and datasets used in our
experiments. Finally, we define our methods for training
and testing erroneous input detectors (Section 3.3) and the
evaluation metrics used to evaluate our results (Section 3.4).
3.1. Defining the Domain
We defined our domain in the context of detecting when
input data to a visual classification model, fpX q Ñ Y , was
classified incorrectly. Incorrect classifications in our ex-
periments encompassed out-of-distribution classes pDoutq,
adversarial examples pAq, corrupted examples (C), and mis-
classified in-distribution data (M). M could be consid-
ered any input from in-domain dataset Din where output
Ypredicted ‰ Yactual. In our experiments, we always con-
sider Dout, A, C, and M to belong to the positive class,
which were in turn classified against the correctly predicted
in-domain dataset Din where Ypredicted “ Yactual.
To build the training set for our binary classifier we use
both validation and test sets from the dataset under test. Our
training set was built such that fpAq ‰ Yactual and fpCq ‰
Yactual — we only used samples which the neural network
classified incorrectly. When an adversarial or corrupted
example is classified correctly, we do not want to remove
the example from the baseline models purview. Adversarial
examples were generated from inputs the model originally
predicted correctly, i.e. fpxq “ Yactual and fpx Ñ Aq ‰
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Yactual. Finally, it is implied that fpDoutq and fpMqwould
produce invalid results, so each example will be taken from
these datasets.
It should be noted that we did not classify in-domain versus
out-of-domain data because we consider the set of every-
thing except Dout to be in-domain: { Din, A, C,M} P D
while Dout R D. Further, our initial experiments were setup
to classify correct example sets from each of the erroneous
examples sets, i.e. classifying correct examples against the
set of misclassified examples. In Section 4.3 we combined
the erroneous example sets, and jointly classified the data
from correct examples.
3.2. Experimental Setup
For our experiments we used several common baseline
datasets and models for image classification. The base-
line models were fed various correct data and erroneous
data and the activations for both the softmax output and the
final hidden layer of the model were collected for use in our
detection models. The baseline models were not altered in
any way during our experiments.
3.2.1. BASELINE DATASETS AND MODELS
Below are the summaries of the pre-trained models used for
each dataset under test. For uniformity, all images passed
to the pre-trained models were resized and normalized the
same way.
MNIST consists of 60,000 training and 10,000 test exam-
ples of 28 x 28 images of handwritten numbers 0 through 9.
We trained a simple convolutional neural network with two
convolutional layers and two fully connected layers. The
model was a standard PyTorch implementation for MNIST
classification1 (LeCun & Cortes, 2010).
CIFAR-10 contains 32 x 32 colored images of 10 differ-
ent classes of objects (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009). The
dataset has 50,000 training images and 10,000 testing im-
ages. Our CIFAR-10 model was trained using the ResNet50
architecture and open-sourced by (Madry et al., 2019).
Tiny ImageNet is a 200-class subset of the ImageNet
dataset where images were cropped and resized to a res-
olution of 64 x 64. Bounding box information was used
in the image cropping (Johnson, 2015). Our Tiny Ima-
geNet model is a pre-trained WideResNet (Zagoruyko &
Komodakis, 2017). The trained model was open-sourced
by (Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2019).
ImageNet consists of 1000 classes of objects (Russakovsky
et al., 2015), with varied dimensions and resolutions. Our
work used the validation dataset to produce examples for
our detection model. We utilized the default pre-trained
1https://github.com/pytorch/examples/tree/master/mnist
ResNet50 model in the Pytorch library for our ImageNet
experiments.
3.2.2. OUT-OF-DISTRIBUTION DATASETS
NotMNIST consists of 28 x 28 black and white images
of letters A-J. We fed the images into the MNIST trained
model (Bulatov, 2011).
CIFAR-100 contains 32 x 32 colored images of 100 dif-
ferent classes of objects (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009). We
filtered out classes similar to those found in CIFAR-10 to en-
sure all classes were truly OoD, leaving 74 classes. Details
on excluded classes are in the appendix.
The Scene UNderstanding dataset (SUN) contains im-
ages of scenes with varying resolutions (Xiao et al., 2010).
Places365 contains 365 classes of scenes with varying im-
age resolutions. We use the high-resolution validation set
for use in our Tiny ImageNet and ImageNet models (Zhou
et al., 2018).
ImageNet-O dataset was constructed from sampled images
from ImageNet-22K (Hendrycks et al., 2020). First, images
overlapping with classes in ImageNet-1K were filtered out.
Next, they retained images that a ResNet50 ImageNet-1K
model classified with high softmax probability. Finally, they
hand-selected a subset of high-quality images.
3.2.3. CORRUPTION DATASETS
CIFAR-10-C, Tiny ImageNet-C, ImageNet-C are image
corruption datasets for the purpose of testing model ro-
bustness (Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2019). Each corrupted
dataset included 15 common visual corruptions such as
Gaussian noise, blur, and digital distortions. Each type of
corruption had five levels of ’severity’ for a total of 75 dis-
tinct corruptions per image. We used each corruption and
severity type in our models. We fed Gaussian noise to the
MNIST model to simulate corruption.
3.2.4. ADVERSARIAL ATTACK METHODS
White-box attacks methods are used to generate adversarial
examples. White-box methods assume the attacker has full
access to the learning model.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) was an attack intro-
duced by Goodfellow et al. (2015). It adjusts the inputs to
maximize the loss based on the back-propagated gradients
of the predicted value: fpAq “ X ` signp∇xJpθ,X ,Yqq.
FGSM examples were generated using =0.01.
Carlini and Wagner l2 Attack (C & W l2) searches for
low distortion in the l2 metric (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b).
L2 attacks measure the Euclidean distance between the orig-
inal and the perturbed examples, equal to the root mean
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Table 1. MNIST and CIFAR-10 experiments for Maximum Softmax Probability (MSP), Sorted Softmax, and Final Hidden Vector
classification. Full results in appendix. The detail column highlights the dataset or method used for the specific domain.
MNIST MSP SORTED SOFTMAX HIDDEN ACTIVATIONS
TEST TYPE DETAIL AUROC AUPR AUROC AUPR AUROC AUPR
MISCLASSIFIED - .985 .971 .986 .979 1.00 1.00
OUT-OF-DISTRIBUTION NOTMNIST .922 .923 .922 .924 1.00 1.00
CORRUPTION GAUSSIAN NOISE .985 .980 .987 .983 1.00 1.00
ADVERSARIAL FGSM ( = 0.3) .999 .998 .999 .999 1.00 1.00
CIFAR-10
MISCLASSIFIED - .926 .902 .925 .900 .750 .724
OUT-OF-DISTRIBUTION SUN .915 .900 .926 .918 .913 .909
CORRUPTION CIFAR-10-C .958 .946 .959 .949 .855 .855
ADVERSARIAL PGD .997 .994 .999 .999 1.00 1.00
ADVERSARIAL C & W l8 .755 .700 .780 .770 1.00 1.00
ADVERSARIAL C & W l2 .934 .890 .964 .965 1.00 1.00
squared difference. Notable in the Carlini and Wagner at-
tacks is κ, which allows a confidence level for the adversar-
ial example to be calibrated. This means examples can be
generated that the neural network predicts incorrectly with
high probability. Examples in our main experiments were
generated with κ “ 0 — we did not search for a perturbed
input which satisfied a specific confidence.
Carlini and Wagner l8 Attack (C & W l8) was a modi-
fied version of the C&W l2 attack. It controls the l8 norm,
i.e. the maximum perturbation applied to any pixel (Carlini
& Wagner, 2017b).
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) finds the perturbation
that maximizes the loss of a model on an input, and, after
each iteration, it projects the perturbation onto an lp ball
of radius  while also clipping values so they fall within a
permitted range (Madry et al., 2019) .
Carlini and Wagner l2, l8 attacks and PGD attack examples
were generated using the adversarial-robustness-toolbox
with default parameters (Nicolae et al., 2018). We used
the PyTorch implementation of the FGSM attack.
ImageNet-A is a dataset of ’natural adversaries’. ImageNet-
A was created by taking examples from the ImageNet
dataset and removing examples the model predicted cor-
rectly. Then, a subset of high-quality images were hand-
selected (Hendrycks et al., 2020). We included this dataset
as an extension to our misclassified experiments.
3.3. Detection Model
We employed a linear Support Vector Machine (SVM) clas-
sifier for our experiments, where examples ({x1}, y1), ...,
({xn}, yn) were trained to maximize the hyperplane be-
tween the groups y=0 and y=1.
We followed the training and evaluation standards of
Hendrycks and Gimpel (2018) to evaluate our detection
model. Specifically, we fit and evaluate the model on the
same data to enabled baseline calculations for Maximum
Softmax Probability (MSP) and to calculate threshold in-
dependent AUROC and AUPR metrics. In the appendix,
we also validated our methods with both five-fold cross-
validation and the optimal SVM hyperplane. Our results
were consistent across all evaluation techniques.
To generate features {x1}...{xn} for our sorted softmax
vector model, we take all values from the softmax output
vector and sort them from smallest to largest. Our hidden
activation vector model utilizes the second to last layer of
all baseline models, which is a fully-connected layer. For
ResNet50 models, this is a vector of 2048 values. For the
WideResNet model the vector is 128 values. Our combined
model uses the hidden activation vector with the sorted
softmax vector appended.
We present results in this paper with a balanced dataset:
each model contains the same number of correct and erro-
neous examples. However, to better simulate real-world
scenarios we use varying ratios of examples (see appendix).
For example, (Hendrycks et al., 2019) tested their Outlier
Exposure using a ratio of 5:1 for Din to Dout. Our results
for a 5:1 ratio are in the appendix. We could not find exist-
ing research with results for specific sets of adversarial or
corrupted examples.
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Table 2. Tiny ImageNet and ImageNet experiments for MSP, Sorted Softmax, and hidden activation vector classification. Full results in
appendix.
TINY IMAGENET MSP SORTED SOFTMAX HIDDEN ACTIVATIONS
TEST TYPE DETAIL AUROC AUPR AUROC AUPR AUROC AUPR
MISCLASSIFIED - .929 .909 .929 .910 .720 .695
OUT-OF-DISTRIBUTION PLACES365 .909 .902 .912 .904 .988 .987
CORRUPTION TINY IMAGENET-C .906 .898 .908 .899 .966 .964
ADVERSARIAL FGSM ( “ 0.01) .898 .889 .902 .893 .999 .999
ADVERSARIAL PGD .991 .992 .991 .993 1.00 1.00
ADVERSARIAL C & W l2 .933 .867 .982 .980 .570 .550
ADVERSARIAL C & W l8 .885 .818 .920 .900 .600 .570
IMAGENET
MISCLASSIFIED - .857 .837 .862 .840 .908 .907
OUT-OF-DISTRIBUTION SUN .832 .827 .837 .832 .998 .998
OUT-OF-DISTRIBUTION PLACES365 .849 .845 .852 .847 1.00 1.00
OUT-OF-DISTRIBUTION IMAGENET-O .675 .570 .680 .580 1.00 1.00
CORRUPTION IMAGENET-C (NOISE) .924 .922 .924 .919 1.00 1.00
NAT.ADVERSARIAL IMAGENET-A .910 .909 .911 .913 .976 .977
ADVERSARIAL PGD .990 .990 .990 .990 1.00 1.00
ADVERSARIAL C & W l8 .870 .800 .915 .883 .804 .808
ADVERSARIAL C & W l2 .890 .810 .966 .954 .772 .763
3.4. Testing and Evaluation Metrics
We evaluate binary detection tasks using three metrics: area
under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC)
and area under the precision-recall curve (AUPR), and false
positive rate at N% true positive rate (FPRN ).
AUROC plots the true positive rate (TPR) against the false
positive rate (FPR). Random classifiers score 50% while per-
fect classifiers achieve 100%. The metric works by varying
threshold values in a binary predictor and is thus threshold-
independent. To ensure threshold-independent metrics in
our models, we use the decision function to the SVM hyper-
plane, which predicts confidence for each examples based
on its signed distance to the hyperplane.
AUPR is another cumulative distribution function which
plots the precision (True Positive)/(True Positive + False
Positive) versus the recall (True Positive)/(True Positive +
False Negative). This metric is more informative when the
number of positive examples varies greatly from the number
of negative examples.
For our combined model we also present FPRN scores,
also used by (Hendrycks et al., 2019; Liang et al., 2018; Liu
et al., 2018). The FPRN calculates the false positive rate
at a set True Positive Rate. In other words, we calculate
the probability that the model fires a false alarm given a
set detection rate. We use TPR of 95%, similar to past
papers. Detecting a high percentage of erroneous inputs
with relatively few false alarms is useful in any real-world
scenario.
4. Results
In this section we present the truncated results of tables 1, 2,
and 3. Full results are in the appendix.
4.1. Sorted Softmax and Hidden Activation Models
In Tables 1 and 2 we directly compared the applicability
of our two detection models with Hendrycks and Gim-
pel’s (2018) Maximum Softmax Probability (MSP). On
average, both of the proposed methods performed better
than MSP. However, in the Table 1 CIFAR-10 experiments,
C & W l8 adversarial examples were difficult to sepa-
rate with both MSP and Sorted Softmax (AUROC 0.755,
AUPR 0.700; AUROC 0.780, AUPR 0.770, respectively),
but could be easily separated with the hidden activations.
Inversely, the hidden activations model struggled to separate
corrupted, misclassified, and out-of-distribution inputs as
well as either sorted softmax or MSP. The more complex
models in Table 2 showed different separation patterns, most
notably, reversing the results from C & W l8.
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Table 3. CIFAR-10, Tiny ImageNet, and ImageNet experiments
for our combined model. Up arrows represent a higher score being
better, while down arrows indicate a lower score is better. See
appendix for all experimental results.
HIDDEN ACTIVATIONS
+ SORTED SOFTMAX
TEST TYPE AUROC Ò AUPR Ò FPR (95%) Ó
CIFAR-10
SUN .964 .961 .162
CIFAR-10-C .973 .968 .106
FGSM .930 .906 .190
C & W l8 1.00 1.00 .000
PGD 1.00 1.00 .000
TINY IMAGENET
MISCLASSIFIED .932 .913 .237
SUN .996 .996 .018
PLACES365 .995 .994 .023
CORRUPTED .984 .984 .075
PGD .100 .100 .000
C & W l2 .986 .985 .059
IMAGENET
MISCLASSIFIEDD .984 .985 .100
SUN 1.00 1.00 .000
PLACES365 1.00 1.00 .000
IMAGENET-C 1.00 1.00 .000
IMAGENET-O 1.00 1.00 .000
IMAGENET-A .995 .995 .027
FGSM 1.00 1.00 0.00
C & W l8 .993 .993 .029
C & W l2 1.00 1.00 0.00
PGD 1.00 1.00 0.00
These findings had two important indications. First, there
was strong evidence that the broad range of erroneous inputs
were linked and could be jointly detected. Second, sorted
softmax and hidden activations performed better than the
MSP baseline, but the success of each method varied across
models and erroneous inputs. In Section 4.2, we overcome
these limitations with a combined model.
4.2. Combined Model
We combined the sorted softmax and hidden activations
features into a single model to detect faulty data. Since
the success of each method varied depending on the model
and erroneous input (Section 4.1), we hypothesized that
combining the features would result in a more consistent
method that could identify all erroneous inputs, regardless
of model. Experiments were performed on CIFAR-10, Tiny
ImageNet and ImageNet datasets — the same faulty data
types examined in Section 4.1.
Table 3 highlights the average AUPR, AUROC, and FPRN
for each experiment. Across all of the experiments, the
combined model surpassed the performance of the methods
in Section 4.1. The lowest performance of the combined
model varied; 0.930 AUROC for FGSM inputs with the
CIFAR-10 model, 0.925 AUROC for C & W l8 with the
Tiny ImageNet model, and 0.984 for misclassified with the
ImageNet model.
In particular, the combined features from ImageNet allowed
nearly perfect classification. One possible explanation could
be that the ImageNet model generated 3048 total features
for the SVM while the WideResNet only provided 328,
indicating that models with more linear activation features
allow easier classification between correct and erroneous
examples.
Figure 3. CIFAR-10 AUROC for several data types classified
against correct predictions with the combined model.
4.3. Combined Datasets
We investigated the possibility of a single model that could
identify all erroneous inputs. Specifically, we classified the
erroneous inputs from correctly predicted examples Din
using the combined feature sets (Section 4.2). Erroneous
inputs were randomly sampled from the set of all erroneous
inputs to create a balanced dataset, i.e. {Dout, A, C,M}
(see appendix for details). We consider the effects of unbal-
anced datasets in Section 4.3.2 and in the appendix.
In Table 4, we present the classification results on the com-
bined datasets. We found that, across all of our models,
erroneous inputs could be detected with high performance
(AUROCs between 0.953 and 0.999). In the appendix, we
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Table 4. Results when we randomly sample inputs from each erro-
neous dataset, excluding PGD attacks and ImageNet-O. ImageNet-
includes results for each domain except PGD and ImageNet-O,
ImageNet+ includes only PGD and ImageNet-O. Experiments are
performed on balanced data and averaged across ten experiments.
Standard deviation is included for each metric.
BASE DATASET AUROC Ò AUPR Ò FPR(95%) Ó
MNIST .999 ˘.0002 .999 ˘.0001 .007 ˘.0001
CIFAR-10 .953 ˘.0001 .954 ˘.0008 .256 ˘.0012
TINY IMAGENET .953 ˘.0004 .952 ˘.0004 .272 ˘.0004
IMAGENET- .970 ˘.0014 .971 ˘.0014 .198 ˘.0110
IMAGENET+ .998 ˘.0003 .998 ˘.0003 .005 ˘.0001
also present the results for MSP, the baseline method we
compare against, and find that our combined model vastly
outperforms the MSP baseline.
A manual analysis of model failures found that PGD at-
tacks and ImageNet-O were consistently not detected by
our model because their maximum softmax probabilities
tended to be higher (PGD inputs had nearly 100% probabil-
ity on average; ImageNet-O had an average probability of
93%) than for correctly classified examples (80% average
for ImageNet, 86% for Tiny ImageNet). All other erroneous
example sets were lower (between 25% and 55% average).
Because we only used linear SVMs, it was impossible for
our models to correctly filter both cases.
4.3.1. HIGH CONFIDENCE ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
We explored the limits of our models’ ability to filter ad-
versarial inputs. Specifically, we generated high confidence
adversarial examples to bypass our MNIST detection model
using Carlini and Wagner l8 and l2 attacks. We gener-
ated 270 adversarial examples with an average confidence
of 99.9%, compared to 99.5% for correctly learned exam-
ples. When tested, our model scores an AUROC of .995
and AUPR of .995, while MSP had an AUROC of .832 and
an AUPR of .708. These experiments highlighted a dis-
tinct benefit of our model over the MSP baseline. However,
we note that we did not exhaustively test every adversarial
attack and that other attacks may fool our technique.
4.3.2. IMBALANCED DATASETS
Building upon the experiments in Section 4.3.1, we also
explored how our model performed when the datasets were
heavily imbalanced. Testing the full set of 9903 correct ex-
amples against 270 adversarial examples, our model scored
.926 and .460 for AUROC and AUPR, respectively. This
was a strong improvement over MSP, which scored .802 and
.058, but it highlighted the limitations of our model with
imbalanced data.
5. Discussion
Erroneous inputs have been largely studied as distinct phe-
nomenon, with the detection of different faulty inputs requir-
ing their own methods. Our experimental results show that
these faulty inputs can be broadly detected by considering a
model’s internal behavior. Furthermore, these patterns are
distinct enough that they are linearly separable. We propose
a new internal activation combination that allows for the
broad detection of erroneous inputs, and establish standards
for the detection of faulty data including adversarial, cor-
rupted, out-of-distribution, and misclassified examples. A
substantial benefit to this approach is that it requires no spe-
cial training or modification to the baseline model. Apart
from Hendrycks and Gimpel (2018), most work in the area
requires some sort of network modification during training
or test time.
Despite this, there are limitations to our approach that fu-
ture research will need to address; first, the current research
focuses on the image domain. It remains to be seen how
well this technique will generalize to other domains (like
natural language processing), but initial work by Hendrycks
and Gimpel (2018) found MSP, which our method directly
builds on, was useful in several other domains, indicating
our techniques will likely generalize. Second, our detec-
tion technique is vulnerable when presented with heavily
imbalanced data (Section 4.3.2). However, given that our
method requires erroneous detection models to be built for
individual models, from activation data from those models,
dataset imbalance is trivial to address in the data collection
process. Third, we limit our erroneous detection models
to linear SVMs, which are incapable of more complicated
classifications. Predictably, these models fail when testing
for multiple erroneous inputs – for example, PGD examples
we generated led to higher maximum softmax probabil-
ity, while other adversarial inputs caused lower maximum
softmax probability. Nonetheless, our models were highly
successful at detecting erroneous inputs, and the simplicity
of our model has important implications for real-time usage.
A single deep learning model capable of understanding any
input is years away at best, and thus detection of ’bad’ data,
which will cause models to fail, is essential for the safe use
of any real-world system. We argue that, by moving towards
detection of any non-learned data in broader application of a
learning based system, we can progress the effective deploy-
ment of machine learning models in real-world applications.
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